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Comments
Teresa Scassa* Social Welfare and Section 7 of
the Charter: Conradv. Halifax
(County of)
The recent case of Conrad v. Halifax (County o#f arose as as. 7 Charter2
challenge to the County regarding the manner in which the plaintiff was
treated as a recipient of municipal social assistance. The case raises a
number of interesting issues at the intersection of the Charter and
administrative law including the scope of the right to "security of the
person"; the scope of the principles of fundamental justice; issues of
access to justice and the Charter; and the relationship between the finding
of a Charter right and the treatment of the plaintiff in the fact-finding
process. This case is particularly significant in the context of poverty law
because the decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, if left to stand,
helps to shut the door on the use of s. 7 in the area of social welfare law
in Nova Scotia.
Facts
The plaintiffs in this case were Mrs. Conrad and her two minor children.
Mrs. Conrad, after separating from her abusive husband, applied for and
received municipal social assistance from the County of Halifax in
January of 1989. In granting social assistance, the municipality required
Mrs. Conrad to apply to Family Court for an order of maintenance against
her husband, and, several months later, to supply a correct address for her
husband. Mrs. Conrad applied to Family Court for the order and supplied
a temporary address for her husband. On June 29, 1989, Mrs Conrad was
notified that her social assistance would be discontinued until the condi-
* Assistant Professor, Dalhousie Law School. I would like to thank my colleagues A. Wayne
MacKay, Elaine Gibson and Richard Devlin for their helpful comments on drafts of this piece.
1. (1993), 124 N.S.R. (2d) 251, 345 A.P.R. 251 (N.S.S.C.) [hereinafter Conrad cited to
N.S.R.]. The case was appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal on a number of procedural
and evidentiary grounds. The Court of Appeal judgment (delivered April 5,1994) focussed on
these grounds, and did not address the Charter issues. In this comment I will discuss the
Charter issues and the treatment of the complainant by the lower court. As a result, I will focus
primarily on the decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.
2. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. I 1 [hereinafter Charter].
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tions were met. Mrs. Conrad subsequently obtained a maintenance order
and supplied another address for her husband; her social assistance was
reinstated. On August 30, Mrs. Conrad was again cut off from her benefits
because the County believed she was living with her husband. She
retained counsel through legal aid. Her lawyer filed a notice of appeal to
the appropriate appeal board and threatened a Supreme Court action on
an emergency basis if interim assistance pending appeal was not pro-
vided. Before either the appeal or the action proceeded, the County
reached an agreement with Mrs. Conrad to reinstate the benefits on
October 5, 1989. On November 2, 1989, the County again concluded that
Mr. and Mrs. Conrad were cohabiting and, for the third time, Mrs. Conrad
was cut off from social assistance. Her lawyer initiated the same proceed-
ings. Once again, he and the County were able to resolve the matter by
agreement, and social assistance was reinstated on November 27, 1989.
Mrs. Conrad ultimately became eligible for provincial -social assistance.
Each time Mrs. Conrad was reinstated, the County paid the arrears for
the period during which she had been cut off from social assistance. Thus,
she and her children received the same amount of money from the County
as they would have received had they never been cut off. Nevertheless,
the plaintiffs brought an action under ss. 73 and 24(1) 4 of the Charter for
a declaration and for damages suffered as a result of, and during the two
periods when, payments were discontinued for cohabitation. They claimed
that the terminations without benefit of a hearing violated their rights
under s. 7.
Gruchy J. rejected the plaintiffs' application on a number of grounds.
First, he found thatMrs. Conrad was not a credible witness. He also found
that her conduct was such that, in spite of the agency's decisions to
reinstate, she had not been, in his view, eligible for social assistance and
thus her security of the person had never been in issue. These findings of
fact allowed Gruchy J. to avoid making definitive conclusions about the
scope of s. 7 of the Charter. Nevertheless, he used strong language to
indicate that any right to social welfare was economic in nature, and thus
could not attract the application of s. 7 of the Charter. Gruchy J. further
3. Section 7 provides:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
4. Section 24(1) reads:
24.(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been
infringed ordenied may apply to a court ofcompetentjurisdiction to obtain such remedy
as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
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determined that the County acted in good faith throughout, such that the
principles of fundamental justice were not violated. In the remainder of
this comment, I will deal with the Charter issues first, before exploring
the issues raised by the factual findings.
Section 7 of the Charter: Security of the Person
Any challenge under s. 7 has two elements.5 First, it must be established
that the affected right of the plaintiff is one of life, liberty or security of
the person. Secondly, it must be shown that the plaintiff has been denied
that right in a manner not in accordance with the principles of fundamen-
tal justice. These principles include the ideas of natural justice and
procedural fairness, but are not limited to them.6
In dealing with the first branch of the s. 7 claim, the plaintiffs' lawyer
made two arguments. The first was that the plaintiffs' s. 7 rights were
violated when the County twice ruled Mrs. Conrad ineligible for social
assistance due to cohabitation. This argument was based on the premise
that s. 7 places an affirmative duty on government to provide the means
necessary to sustain one's physical and emotional security. This right to
"security of the person" could only be denied in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice. The manner in which Mrs. Conrad was
removed from social assistance on two occasions was thus argued to be
a violation of s. 7 because the removals were not in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.
The second argument was that once Mrs. Conrad had been found
eligible for social assistance, she and her children had a security of the
person interest in receiving the regular assistance payments. Conse-
quently, they could not be deprived of those payments except in accor-
dance with the principles of fundamental justice. According to this
argument, the deprivation of social assistance would give rise to a
violation of the security of the person. However, the security of the person
argument was not based on an affirmative right to welfare. Rather, it was
framed in terms of the fact that, as a social assistance recipient, Mrs.
Conrad had already been adjudged by the municipality to be a person in
5. R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387 at 401 [hereinafter Beare].
6. Ibid. at 402; see also Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 512.
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need7 such that her security of the person would be affected by an arbitrary
or erroneous withdrawal of assistance.8
The argument that there is an affirmative right to welfare protected by
s. 7 is avery difficult one to make, and has not been accepted by the courts
of any other province.9 Gruchy J. was reluctant to find that such an
affirmative right existed.10 Unfortunately, he effectively decided the
issue on this point without giving appropriate consideration to the second,
more nuanced argument. He also went further than was necessary on the
first point, finding that the plaintiffs' rights to welfare were primarily
economic in nature, thereby categorically shutting the door explicitly left
open by the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy v. Quebec.1
In Irwin Toy, the Court found that while the legislative history of s. 7
indicated that property rights, and by extension economic rights, were
deliberately excluded from protection, this did not mean that no "right
with an economic component" could fall under the protection of s. 7. The
Court went on to say:
Lower courts have found that the rubric of "economic rights" embraces a
broad spectrum of interests, ranging from such rights, included in various
international covenants, as rights to social security, equal pay for equal
work, adequate food, clothing and shelter, to traditional property-
contract rights .... We do not, at this moment, choose to pronounce upon
whether those economic rights fundamental to human life or survival are
to be treated as though they are of the same ilk as corporate-commercial
economic rights. 2
7. The Social Assistance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 432 defines a person in need as follows:
4.(d) "person in need" means a person who, by reason of adverse conditions, requires
assistance in the form of money, goods or services."
Under s. 9(1) of the same statute, the social services committee is under a positive obligation
to "furnish assistance to all persons in need."
8. Arguably, this approach does not require proof of continuing eligibility for there to be a
foundation for a Charterclaim. In other words, once an individual is adjudged a person in need
for the purposes of receiving social assistance, the principles of fundamental justice must be
complied with before that person's social assistance payments can be terminated. This is a
significant point since Gruchy J. tied his findings of Mrs. Conrad's ineligibility to his s. 7
findings (supra note 1 at 271).
9. Gosselin v. Quebec (P.-G.), [1992] R.J.Q. 1647 (C.S.) (on appeal to the C.A.Q).
10. Ian Morrison states: "There is little chance that s. 7 will be interpreted as creating an
absolute right to welfare" (I. Morrison, "Security of the Person and the Person in Need: Section
Seven of the Charter and the Right to Welfare" (1988), 4 J.L. & Social Pol'y 1 at 1).
11. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter Irwin Toy].
12. Ibid. at 1003-04. However, Gruchy J. is not the only judge to deny the application of s. 7
in a social welfare case since Irwin Toy. See, for example, Gosselin, supra note 9; Fernandes
v. Manitoba (Director of Social Services (Winnipeg Central)) (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 402
(Man. C.A.).
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Thus, in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court left open the
possibility of differentiating between so-called economic rights, Gruchy
J. chose not to engage in this process of distinction. Instead, he relied on
the view of Peter Hogg that extending the meaning of security of the
person to the social welfare context "would bring under judicial scrutiny
all of the elements of the modem welfare state." 3 Yet Hogg makes these
comments in response to what he calls "suggestions" for abroad interpre-
tation of s. 7. These so-called "suggestions" are, in fact, dicta of the
Supreme Court of Canada 4 and, as such, should be given more weight.
Further, the kind of "floodgates" argument put forth by Hogg seems to be
premised on an extremely broad interpretation of s. 7-one which, for
example, might posit an affirmative right to welfare. Rather than seek a
middle ground, the position of Hogg, adopted by Gruchy J., is to shut the
door entirely.
The exclusion of Charter protection of interests which arise in the
social welfare context thus appears to be premised overtly on their
"economic" nature, and more covertly on a reluctance of the judiciary to
involve itself in difficult policy choices. This, at least initial, reluctance
has been typical of courts in all areas of Charter application even though
the Charter has profoundly transformed the role of the courts in our
constitutional order. However, the Supreme Court of Canada, rather than
limiting or constraining the principles enshrined in the Charter, has
mandated an approach which seeks to give an expansive meaning to the
protected rights.' Deference to legislative and policy choices can be
shown in the process of balancing under s. 1.16 It is therefore inappropri-
ate for the courts to use deference to the legislature as a reason for
restricting a Charter right at the threshold level. Moreover, to invoke
13. Gruchy J., supra note 1 at 271-72, citing P.V. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d
ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 1030.
14. Hogg, ibid. at 1029.
15. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly stated that courts should give
Charterrights abroad and liberal interpretation. In LawSociety of Upper Canada v. Skapinker,
[19841 1 S.C.R. 357 at 366-67, Estey J. stated:
Narrow and technical interpretation, if not modulated by a sense of the unknowns of the
future, can stunt the growth of the law and hence the community it serves. All this has
long been with us in the process of developing the institutions of government under the
B.N.A. Act, 1867 (now the Constitution Act, 1867). With the Constitution Act, 1982
comes a new dimension, a new yardstick of reconciliation between the individual and
the community and their respective rights, a dimension which, like the balance of the
Constitution, remains to be interpreted and applied by the Court.
16. In McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 230 at 288, La Forest J. for the
majority of the Court wrote: "the reconciliation of claims not only of competing individuals or
groups but also the proper distribution of scarce resources must be weighed in a s. 1 analysis."
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deference in the specific context of the social welfare system is particu-
larly troubling in that it risks exacerbating class-based barriers to access
to the courts in general and to Charterremedies in particular. Denying the
application of s. 7 of the Charter in the social welfare context is not a
neutral exercise in constitutional interpretation-it is a choice about
whose interests we can afford the time and energy to protect.
Consequently, of the two premises on which courts have thus far based
their exclusion of s. 7 claims in the social welfare context, one is a
"threshold" problem (that of the nature of the right asserted), while the
other relates to the relationship of the courts to the legislature and bears
significant consequences for access to justice. I will argue that only the
first concern is relevant to the s. 7 argument; concerns about the appro-
priate role of the courts are more properly a factor in an assessment of the
legislative scheme under s. 1 of the Charter.
The threshold problem which remains is that of the proper character-
ization of social welfare rights, which, in Conrad, Gruchy J. dismissed as
being "economic" in nature. The position that "economic rights" are not
protected under s. 7 of the Charter was set out in an earlier decision of the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Bernard v. Dartmouth Housing Author-
ity.17 In Bernard, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal rejected the argument
that the Public Housing Authority had violated the appellant's right to
security of the person by giving her notice to vacate in circumstances that
would not have sufficed under the Residential Tenancies Act. The Court
found that "the right asserted was a proprietary right which bestowed a
direct economical benefit on the appellant and as such has no constitu-
tional protection afforded under s. 7 of the Charter."'8 This is a very
narrow construction of the scope of s. 7 and the nature of the right to
public housing, a construction that fbcusses exclusively on the economic
benefit to public housing tenants of having lower rent. The plaintiffs
presence in public housing was characterized in the case as a "choice,"
thereby further removing the plaintiff and her claim from the realm of
basic human needs. This artificial distance created by the Court between
the plaintiff and the reality of her poverty serves to distort the facts in
order to avoid engaging with the real question of the nature of the rights
of tenants in public housing.
The fact that welfare payments involve money should not be taken to
mean that they are purely an economic interest. In a recent article,
Professor Jackman argues that the outright dismissal of s. 7 claims
17. (1989), 88 N.S.R. (2d) 190, (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 81 (N.S.A.D.) [hereinafter Bernard
cited to N.S.R.].
18. Ibid. at 196.
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relating to social welfare "misconstrues both the interests asserted by the
plaintiffs, and the legislative history of s. 7 itself."'19 It has also been
argued that since most areas of human activity or endeavour have
economic and non-economic aspects (and this is especially so in a market
society), the characterization of something as a purely "economic right"
is a "result-oriented process in the context of s. 7 where the characteriza-
tion of the interest determines whether it is eligible for constitutional
protection or not."' 0 In other words, the courts can exclude areas from
Charter application simply by labelling them as "economic." Similarly,
rights with an economic component can be brought under the umbrella of
s. 7 by emphasizing their other, non-pecuniary aspects.21 Thus, it is open
to the court to identify and emphasize only the economic aspects of
welfare in order to exclude it from s. 7 protection.
The potential for result-oriented approaches to the characterization of
rights as economic or non-economic for the purposes of the application
of s. 7 is troubling. Ideally, it should lead courts to take a far more
purposive and context-sensitive approach to evaluating the nature of
rights and interests. Under s. 7, the effects-oriented approach to Charter
interpretation mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Big M.
Drug Mart Ltd.22 and echoed by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in
DartnouthHalifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks23
would require a consideration of security of the person in light of the
effects on individuals of the deprivation of the benefit, rather than on the
nature of the benefit. Thus, instead of characterizing welfare payments as
"economic rights" because they are effected through a transfer of money,
the focus of the court should be on the relationship between those
payments and the security of the person. Where the suspension of welfare
payments may leave an individual in a state of poverty, it is difficult to see
19. M. Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social Welfare Claims" (1993)
19 Queen's L.J. 65 at 76.
20. Morrison, supra note 10 at 11.
21. See, for example, the "doctors" cases of Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services
Commission) (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 171 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Wilson], and Khaliq-
Kareemi v. Health Services and Insurance Commission (N.S.) (1989), 89 N.S.R. (2d) 388,227
A.P.R. 388, 57 D.L.R. (4th) 505 (C.A.) [hereinafter Khaliq-Kareemi cited to N.S.R.]. These
cases are discussed infra.
22. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 331-36.
23. (1993), 119 N.S.R. (2d) 91, 330 A.P.R. 91 (C.A.) [hereinafter Sparks cited to N.S.R.].
Although this is a case decided under s. 15 of the Charter, it is useful for the approach taken
to the Charter question by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.
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how the continuation of payments are not directly related to the security
of the person.24
Gruchy J.'s finding that the plaintiffs' right to social assistance was
economic in nature and therefore outside the scope of s. 7 of the Charter5
is a gross oversimplification of the meaning of "economic rights" as
discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy. The court in that
case recognized the nuances implicit in the term "economic rights."26
Most things in life have an economic aspect. Indeed, economists make a
living ascribing costs and benefits to a range of factors many of which are
not traditionally thought of as economic, and some of which are clearly
intangible. In order to avoid this sinkhole of economic analysis, it is
necessary to consider the term "economic" in a more purposive manner.
For example, if one were to substitute "pecuniary" for economic, it would
be fair to say that the Charter is not meant to protect purely pecuniary
interests. Where a right or interest combines pecuniary and non-pecuni-
ary elements, it is necessary to assess the relative importance of the non-
pecuniary interests. In the context of social welfare, Morrison argues:
Although welfare obviously involves an economic component, the nature
and purpose of welfare payments is unique. Denial or termination of
welfare benefits is a deprivation of an expectation of an economic
commodity but ... it is also a direct and serious threat to fundamental
noneconomic interests, the protection of which is the direct purpose for
provision of the economic commodity.27
Thus, the economic dimension of welfare payments is neither determina-
tive of the "classification" of welfare for Charter purposes, nor is it the
fundamental characteristic of social assistance.
24. In Blackburn v. Social Assistance Appeal Board (N.S.) (1987), 80 N.S.R. (2d) 30
(N.S.S.C.) at 35, the Court held that clear evidence of cohabitation was needed "[flor the
Department to take the drastic action of removing essential support for a person in need of
benefits and her two children." The characterization of the benefits as "essential support," and
of their removal as a "drastic action," indicate a recognition by the Court that welfare benefits
have more than a purely economic dimension.
25. Supra note 1 at271.
26. For example, the Court found that some so-called economic rights were "fundamental to
human life or survival," while others were more "corporate-commercial" in nature (supra note
11 at 1003-04). Under other sections of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada has
recognized multiple dimensions to so-called economic rights. For example, in Rocket v. Royal
College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, a case dealing with freedom of
expression and commercial advertising, McLachlin J., for the unanimous Court, stated at p.
241: "The argument against applying s. 2(b) to commercial speech rests on the proposition that
the Charter was not intended to protect economic interests. This argument has been rejected by
this Court on the ground that advertising involves more than economics."
27. Morrison, supra note 10 at 13.
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In other cases under s. 7 the courts in Nova Scotia and elsewhere have
recognized "non-pecuniary" dimensions to other activities involving
economic gain. In Wilson,2 the British Columbia Court of Appeal
recognized important non-pecuniary dimensions to the right to practice
one's profession in the region of one's choice. In Khaliq-Kareemi,29 a
similar issue was treated in the same manner by the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal, which cited with approval the following passage from the
reasons of Dickson C.J.C. in Reference Re Public Service Employee
Relations Act (Alta.):
It has been suggested that associational activity for the pursuit of economic
ends should not be accorded constitutional protection. If by this it is meant
that something as fundamental as a person's livelihood or dignity in the
workplace is beyond the scope of constitutional protection, I cannot agree.
If, on the other hand, it is meant that concerns of an exclusively pecuniary
nature are excluded from such protection, such an argument would merit
careful consideration. In the present case, however, we are concerned with
interests which go far beyond those of a merely pecuniary nature. 0
The non-pecuniary aspects of liberty in both Wilson and Khaliq-Kareemi
included the "sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being"
which flowed from a person's employment.3" Thus, important intangible
elements relating to self-esteem may supersede the pecuniary component
of an interest in order to trigger the application of s. 7 of the Charter.3 2
Just as the right to practice medicine in the place and manner of one's
choosing involves pecuniary and non-pecuniary dimensions, the provi-
sion of social assistance, apart from its pecuniary aspects, has significant
non-pecuniary dimensions for the recipient. In fact, Canada's interna-
tional obligations recognize basic social security as an important human
right which is inextricably linked to other fundamental rights of individu-
als. For example, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provides that:
28. Supra note 21.
29. Supra note 21.
30. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at 367-68 [hereinafterRe Public Service Employee Relations], cited
with approval in Khaliq-Kareemi, supra note 21 at 395. It should be noted that these remarks
of Dickson C.J.C. in Re Public Service Employee Relations were made with respect to s. 2(d)
of the Charter. Nevertheless, in Khaliq-Kareemi, they were adopted with respect to an
interpretation of the liberty rights protected by s. 7.
31. This language is from the reasons of Dickson C.J.C. in Re Public Service Employee
Relations, ibid. at 368 quoted with approval in Wilson and Khaliq-Kareemi, supra note 21.
32. Note that in Khaliq-Kareemi, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decided the question based
on the liberty issue, concluding that in such circumstances "it is not necessary to consider the
right to security ofthe person" (supra note2l at397). Thus the Court ofAppeal has deliberately
left open the possibility that such intangible concerns may similarly outweigh the pecuniary
character of an interest in relation to the "security of the person."
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22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and
is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each
State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his
dignity and the free development of his personality.3
The qualified right to social security recognized in this article is clearly
acknowledged to be related to aspects of dignity and self-realization.
which are similar to those recognized in Wilson and Khaliq-Kareemi as
being protected under s. 7. The "sense of identity, self worth and
emotional well being" protected by the courts in Wilson and Khaliq-
Kareemi are related as much to the ability to work in one's chosen
profession as they are to the ability to feed and clothe oneself and one's
children. Indeed, to find otherwise is to locate s. 7 rights in an elitist (and
sexist) conception of identity and autonomy where that which is valued
relates to activity outside of the home, and is directed to self-fulfilment
rather than to the ability to meet the basic needs of oneself and one's
dependents.
In the last decade or so, courts in Canada have begun to recognize the
importance of the social welfare scheme and the rights of welfare
recipients.34 Further, it has been argued that entitlements to social
assistance in Canada are "viewed as integral to and reflective of values
which are profoundly social in nature. '35 These values are argued to
include
the ideas that Canada is an interdependent community; that individual
Canadians are not the sole guarantors of their own social and economic
well-being; and that there is a minimum level of welfare below which no
Canadian will be allowed to fall. These values, and the programs through
which they are concretized, are essential aspects of the s. 7 right to "life,
liberty and security of the person," understood in its proper social,
philosophical, and historical context. 6
Thus the "security of the person" aspects of social welfare not only
implicate concerns for individual autonomy and dignity, but also form
part of shared national and international values.37
33. GA Res. 217(m-), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). The
right to social security is also recognized in article 9 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 16 December 1966, U.K.T.S. 1977 No. 6, 6I.L.M. 360.
34. This trend is documented by Morrison, supra note 10 at 5-9.
35. Jackman, supra note 19 at 78.
36. Ibid. at 79.
37. Without deciding on the scope of the meaning of "security of the person," Wilson J. in
Singh v. MinisterofEmploymentandImmigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 206-07 [hereinafter
Singh], canvassed authority which relied upon the rights to the necessities of life as set out in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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For example, in Gosselin, while finding that s. 7 did not guarantee an
affirmative right to social assistance, the Quebec Superior Court never-
theless identified a relationship between poverty and the loss of security
of the person: "Ultimement, la pauvret6 porte atteinte h la s6curit6
psychologique, intellectuelleetmorale etentraveindirectementl'exercice
de la libert6." 3 Destitution, which is the condition sought to be remedied
or avoided by social assistance payments, is clearly more than a red line
on an accountant's page. It is a condition which fundamentally affects the
physical, psychological and emotional security of the person. Because
the arbitrary withdrawal of social assistance by the state directly affects
the security of the person in this manner, it is difficult to justify the denial
of Charterprotection to those who have been adversely affected. It would
be a disturbing and blatantly ironic result if relatively affluent profession-
als such as doctors can draw on s. 7 to protect their "rights" to practice
medicine, while individuals in poverty have no similar protection be-
cause of the alleged "pecuniary" character of their rights.3 9
Because of Gruchy J.'s abrupt denial of the application of s. 7 to cases
involving social welfare, he did not even consider the plaintiffs' second
argument. The effect of this argument would be to guarantee certain
rights of procedural fairness to individuals who have been adjudged by
the organs of the state to be persons in need of the most basic kind of
assistance and thus individuals whose security of the person would be
jeopardized by any arbitrary withdrawal of support. In Gosselin, the
Superior Court, after establishing the link between poverty and the loss
of security of the person, went a step further:
Si l'inscurit caus~e par la pauvret6 6tait directement attribuable I'ttat
ou h ses institutions, ne pourrait-on pr~tendre que l'Etat aurait port6
atteinte h la s6curit6 de la personne? Ii faudrait alors se poser la question
de savoir si l'atteinte est ou non contraire aux principes de justice
fondamentale.40
In other words, while rejecting an affirmative right to welfare, the Quebec
Superior Court conceded that where the State is directly responsible for
the poverty of the individual, the individual's right to security of the
38. Supra note 9 at 1670.
39. The security of the person argument in this case is also bolstered by the approach of the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Sparks. In that case, the Court took the approach that the
existence of legislation to assist a particular group of individuals (in that case public housing
tenants) was an indication of their particular disadvantage: "In fact, the Legislature recognized
the group of persons who qualify for public housing as being disadvantaged; a subsidized
housing scheme was created to alleviate their disadvantage" (supra note 23 at 99). Similarly,
it can be argued that the legislature has recognized the dire circumstances of persons in need
of social assistance by establishing a legislative scheme to assist them.
40. Supra note 9 at 1670.
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person has been violated, and the analysis must then shift to consider
whether the violation was in accordance with the principles of fundamen-
tal justice.41 While the arbitrary withdrawal of social assistance is clearly
not the root cause of someone's poverty, it would seem nonetheless
reasonable to consider that such a withdrawal, by removing the "safety
net," would violate the right to "security of the person."
In shying away from a recognition of an affirmative right to welfare,
it is unnecessary to completely cut off social welfare recipients from
access to the Charter to protect their fundamental rights. An analogy can
be drawn with the medical services cases. It would be unreasonable for
any doctor to argue that state regulation of medical services is an
unjustifiable violation of the right to liberty. Section 7 makes it clear that
the right to liberty can always be constrained, so long as any constraints
accord with principles of fundamental justice. Similarly, the right to
security of the person can be circumscribed by the same principles. The
structure of s. 7 allows for state regulation and intervention; its one
prescription is that any such intervention must comply with the principles
of fundamental justice. There may be no absolute right to welfare, nor
may there be a right to a certain quantum of welfare, in the same way that
doctors have no absolute right to the unregulated practice of medicine.
Nevertheless, in either case there is a requirement of conformity with the
principles of fundamental justice, which include rights of procedural
fairness.
Principles of Fundamental Justice
Although Gruchy J. did not find a security of the person dimension to
social welfare that would attract the application of s. 7 of the Charter, he
nonetheless chose to consider whether the administrative system in place
had infringed the principles of fundamental justice. The plaintiffs had
argued that the discontinuation of interim social assistance should not
take place without according arecipient "a full hearing and full disclosure
of all relevant facts."42 In other words, the plaintiffs argued that, rather
than discontinue the social assistance because of abeliefthat Mrs. Conrad
41. However, Reeves J. of the Superior Court went on to significantly circumscribe the
situations where the state could be said to be responsible for an individual's poverty. The court
found that individuals are largely responsible for their financial situation, in conjunction with
factors which are beyond the control of the state such as geographic location and economic
cycles (supra note 9 at 1676). The state is only responsible in exceptional circumstances, such
as in the cases of victims of universal vaccination programs and military victims of armed
conflict, where the state owes individuals some form of material security (supra note 9 at 1670).
42. Conrad, supra note I at 258.
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was cohabiting with her husband, the defendant, at a minimum, should
have approached Mrs. Conrad with its evidence of cohabitation in order
to ascertain its validity. The municipality countered by arguing that the
full evidentiary hearing provided for an appeal of a decision to discon-
tinue satisfied the requirements of procedural fairness.4 3
In his analysis of the principles of fundamental justice, Gruchy J. chose
to undertake a fairly superficial assessment of the administrative proce-
dures in place. He found that there had been no breach of the principles
of fundamental justice. He stated: "The personnel administering the
procedure appeared to me to be well trained, thoughtful and competent.
Their motivation was clearly to render assistance to those in need."'
However, good faith is by no means determinative of procedural fairness.
All the good intentions in the world do not substitute for fundamental
justice where the system in place allows for the arbitrary withdrawal of
assistance. Gruchy J.'s further finding that "[tihe legislation, regulations
and policy all contemplated the rights of the individual to appeal" does
not address the fact that assistance is withdrawn pending any such appeal.
Indeed, there was evidence in the case, cited by Gruchy J., that social
assistance workers strongly criticized the process and "recommended
that in the future emergency assistance should be continued until an
appeal is heard."'4
The requirements of fundamental justice may depend on the place of
the plaintiff within the administrative scheme. In Re Webb and Ontario
Housing Corporation, the Ontario Court of Appeal made a distinction
between the procedural rights of someone who was merely an applicant
for public housing, and the rights of someone who had already been
accepted into such housing:
43. Evidence in the case established that the normal waiting period between discontinuance
of social assistance and the hearing of an appeal ranged from five to eight weeks (supra note
1 at 264).
44. Supra note 1 at 272.
45. Of the two welfare workers who testified before the court, Gruchy J. stated that they
"wrote a memorandum dated December 12, 1989, concerning this entire case and in a critique
of the entire procedure involved in it, recommended that in the future emergency assistance
should be continued until an appeal is heard. In that manner, they concluded, the threat of
inappropriately depriving maintenance to children would be avoided" (ibid. at 266). Neverthe-
less, Gruchy J. relied on the decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Carvery v. Halifax
(City of) (1993), 123 N.S.R. (2d) 83, 340 A.P.R. 83, in which the Court found that under the
relevant legislation there was no right to the continuance of social assistance pending appeal.
Instead, there was merely a discretion on the part of the Director which was unconstrained by
the need to take into account any particular factors or considerations (Conrad, supra note 1
at 268).
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Once the appellant became a tenant she acquired a very real and substantial
benefit because of her reliance on and eligibility for welfare. The determi-
nation to grant her this benefit was made when she was accepted as a
tenant. That decision was one which, in my view, could be made by O.H.C.
without any intervention of a rule or principle of procedural "fairness".
However, once she became a tenant and thus "qualified" for and received
the very real benefit of a reduced and subsidized rent, the situation
changed.'
An analogy can be made to the present case, where it should have been
significant that Mrs. Conradhad already been found to be aperson in need
by the County. Thus, even if there is no affirmative right to welfare, the
principles of fundamental justice should apply where a welfare recipient
is already receiving benefits. The withdrawal of necessary assistance
places the plaintiffs' security of the person at risk.
Without engaging in any substantive review of quantum of benefits
and range of benefits, the courts may still guarantee that the principles of
fundamental justice will apply to the process by which individuals are
deemed eligible to receive, and to continue to receive, social assistance
in their period of need. The "principles of fundamental justice" are
flexible enough that courts may well find that different levels of protec-
tion are available to those applying for social assistance, and those who
are already receiving welfare assistance.47 Thus, it could be argued that
more is required in terms of process where one is about to be cut off from
a benefit already received. In Conrad, the argument would be that the
plaintiff, because she had already been adjudged a "person in need," was
entitled to certain procedural guarantees such as a hearing, and the
continuance of social assistance until the outcome of the hearing, before
she could be removed from social assistance.
A possible underlying reason for judicial reluctance to accord s. 7
protection to aspects of the social welfare system is the concern that any
such step would unduly burden the system with the costly and time-
consuming trappings of adversarial litigation.48 This appears to have been
46. (1979), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 187 at 195 (Ont. C.A.). Note, however, that in the context of s. 7
rights, Wilson J. in Singh, supra note 37 at 209 appears to reject the idea of a dichotomy as
between rights and privileges.
47. InSingh, supra note 37 at 213, Wilson J. indicates a willingness to accept "that procedural
fairness may demand different things in different contexts."
48. For example, in Gosselin, Reeves J. of the Superior Court of Quebec found that there is
no affirmative right to welfare (supra note 9 at 1669). In reaching this conclusion, Reeves J.
made a specific distinction between rights that require an active intervention and commitment
of resources by the state, and rights that require only some accommodation by existing
institutions of the state.
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a concern of Gruchy J. in Conrad.49 It is questionable whether, in
considering the requisites of the principles of fundamental justice in a
given case, courts should weigh the financial burden of any additional
procedural safeguards against the right affected and the degree to which
it is infringed. This type of "balancing" analysis properly belongs under
s. 1. Thus cost, while a potential consideration in attempting to justify a
violation of the Charter, should not be a suitable consideration for
entirely foreclosing access to the Charter. However, even under a s. 1
analysis, the Supreme Court of Canada has raised serious questions as to
whether administrative flexibility is a sufficient reason to warrant over-
riding a Charter right. In Singh, Wilson J. stated:
The principles of natural justice and procedural fairness which have long
been espoused by our courts, and the constitutional entrenchment of the
principles of fundamental justice in s. 7, implicitly recognize that a
balance of administrative convenience does not override the need to
adhere to these principles5
Wilson J. would seem to require a very stringent standard of review under
s. 1 where a violation of s. 7 has been found. In following this proposition
from Singh, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Sparks engaged in a
careful balancing of the need for administrative flexibility and the rights
of public housing tenants. 5' A similar approach is necessary in this case,
where the withdrawal of social assistance pending any form of appeal
allows for unfettered administrative flexibility in complete disregard of
the needs of social welfare recipients.
49. See, for example, his comments in Conrad, supra note I at 266-67, 271-72. These
concerns are shared in the United States Supreme Court cases of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) [hereinafter Goldberg], and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) [hereinafter
Mathews]. Goldberg involved a constitutional challenge to a welfare system which did not
provide for a pre-termination hearing for social assistance recipients. The Court, in concluding
that some pre-termination process was warranted, carefully weighed the rights of the plaintiffs
against the state interest in conserving its fiscal and administrative resources. Similarly, in
Mathews, a case which involved a constitutional challenge to the procedural fairness of a
process for terminating disability benefits, the United States Supreme Court outlined the
factors to be considered in evaluating any such benefits scheme at p. 335:
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of
three distinctfactors: First, theprivate interest thatwillbe affectedby the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement will
entail.
50. Supra note 37 at 219.
51. Supra note 23 at 100.
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The Factual Record
Another important dimension to this case concerns the findings of fact
made by Gruchy J. Because no hearing ever took place regarding the
withdrawal of support, there was no evidentiary record before the court.
As aresult, Gruchy J. made anumber of findings of factin the case. These
findings are ones which will necessarily affect any further proceedings,
and which would militate against a successful s. 7 claim. 2 They also
provide an independent basis for rejecting the s. 7 argument. For ex-
ample, Gruchy J. found that Mrs. Conrad was not a credible witness, and
that her conduct virtually amounted to fraud. 3 In particular, the judge
found as a fact that Mrs. Conrad was cohabiting with her husband at the
periods of time in which social assistance was suspended. Thus, in spite
of the municipality's decision to reinstate in both instances, Gruchy J.
effectively found that assistance had been rightfully discontinued. The
findings of fact therefore have the impact of removing any basis for a s. 7
Charter claim. 4
It is important to realize that in this case Mrs. Conrad had fallen into
an administrative conundrum. At the heart of the alleged violation of her
s. 7 rights was the fact that she had been denied interim assistance
pending appeal from the municipality's decision to discontinue her social
assistance. Nevertheless, because the municipality chose to reinstate her
before either of her two appeals was heard, there could be no record of
facts from a hearing. Although it is not to be assumed that the municipal-
52. This is the reason why procedural and evidentiary matters were made the focus of the
Appeal to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. An appeal on the Charter issue would be futile in
light of such adverse findings.
53. For example, he found that, in Mrs. Conrad's case, the welfare workers had "unearthed
what was essentially a fraud" (supra note I at 266). He also referred, at several points in his
decision, to what he considered to be Mrs. Conrad's untruthfulness (supra note 1 at 265-66).
54. Thus, in the words of Gruchy J.: "I therefore conclude that the plaintiffs had no 'right to'
the municipal assistance and, therefore, if such right is included in '... life, liberty and security
of the person', then the plaintiffs has [sic] no such right" (supra note 1 at 271.) Interestingly,
the Court of Appeal, in its decision, restated the findings of the trial judge in this way: "Even
though Justice Gruchy decided the issue of eligibility against the appellants, a review of his
reasons for judgment reveals that the ultimate result would not have depended exclusively on
this ruling. The fact is that he found the action also failed on constitutional grounds" (Conrad
v. Halifax (County o) (5 April 1994), Halifax C.A. No. 02923 at 5). This determination is in
contrast to the words of Gruchy J. cited above. While Gruchy J. gives a curt dismissal of the
s. 7 arguments, it would appear that he turns the findings into the main focus for his decision.
The approach of Gruchy J. creates such an interdependence between the s. 7 argument and the
factual findings that any appeal from the decision of Gruchy J. becomes extraordinarily
difficult. An appeal of the determination that social welfare rights are not protected by s. 7
becomes pointless in light of the findings of fact; the more difficult appeal on procedural and
evidentiary grounds becomes meaningless in light of the s. 7 determination.
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ity acted in bad faith, it is clear that similar tactics could be used by any
social welfare agency trying to reduce its budget by cutting off recipients
and only reinstating those who threaten legal action. The vulnerability of
people in such circumstances cannot be underestimated. This vulnerabil-
ity continues after the fact: Mrs. Conrad's rights have arguably been
violated, but the very manner in which they were violated means she gets
no findings of fact from below. In Conrad, this means that the primary
finder of fact is a court which lacks the expertise of the agency in assessing
the merits of social welfare claims.
The approach of Gruchy J. in making these findings of fact is
problematic from a number of points of view. First, he reconsiders the
only clear "facts" available from below: the two decisions to reinstate
payments. 5 It is questionable whether it is appropriate for the court to
effectively reevaluate an agency decision to reinstate, when the founda-
tion for that decision was not contested by the parties56 Secondly, his
approach shifts the issue from the right not to have social assistance
benefits arbitrarily withdrawn, to the issue of the merits of the with-
drawal. In a sense, this part of thejudgment reads as an "in the alternative"
justification for the refusal to consider the case under the Charter.
Thirdly, Gruchy J.'s approach to the facts is closely tied to the issue of
cohabitation. He found that Mrs. Conrad was cohabiting with her hus-
band at both points in time when the benefits were suspended. Quite apart
from the rather sketchy evidence upon which he based his finding,
Gruchy J. makes no clear statement of the law regarding cohabitation. In
other words, he sets out no legal principle or test against which he
measures his findings of fact. His inquiry into cohabitation does not
appear to go beyond the simple sharing of premises by Mrs. Conrad and
her husband. Recent case law indicates that for cohabitation to be a factor
in the withdrawal of municipal social assistance, there must also be proof
of some financial contribution.5 7 No such proof is evident in this case.
55. In fact, Gruchy J. criticizes Mrs. Conrad for seeking these reinstatements, and states that
"the matter ought to have been permitted to proceed through the established appeal route so that
the evidence of each of the parties could have been examined in accordance with the correct
and established procedure" (supra note 1 at 266).
56. Gruchy J. states: "The fact that the defendant twice reinstated the plaintiffs' assistance is
not, in my view, determinative of the plaintiffs' entitlement. The reinstatement in these
circumstances only shows that the parties' counsel agreed to the reinstatement" (supra note 1
at 269). The Court of Appeal was in agreement, stating: "the matter of cohabitation was not
admitted by the respondent (defendant) prior to trial. This gave the subject of cohabitation the
potential to become a live issue at trial" (supra note 54 at 3).
57. Supra note 19.
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The findings of fact in this case are troubling at another level. The
result of these findings is to conclude that, quite apart from the Charter
issues, Mrs. Conrad was not entitled to receive social welfare benefits. In
taking this approach, Gruchy J. has effectively reduced an important
Charter issue to an individual level. The recipient of social welfare is
portrayed as blameworthy, thereby obviating the need to take the Charter
claim seriously. This individualization of the Charter claim is similar to
that which occurred in the lower court decision in Bernard, where the fact
that the plaintiff was described as one who "freely took advantage of the
benefits of this housing"5 diminished the force of the Charterclaim. This
pattern is evident in other cases as well. 9 Indeed, Jackman argues that for
some courts, there persists a view "that poverty is essentially the product
of inherent personality traits in the poor."60 This inherent blameworthi-
ness of the poor for their own poverty is disturbing, particularly where it
can lead to their exclusion from access to courts or to Charter remedies.
In Conrad, the findings of Gruchy J. with respect to Mrs. Conrad's
credibility are so extreme, and in such stark contradiction with the dual
decisions of the authority to reinstate her social assistance payments, that
some sort of blaming appears to be taking place. It would be troubling
indeed if the individualization of Charter claims-a form of blaming the
victim-were to occur primarily in the context of social welfare and
poverty law.
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that in Conrad Gruchy J. has passed up an opportunity
to further develop the context-sensitive approach of the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal in Sparks. Clearly, if there are flaws in the administrative
processes which serve as a final safety net for people facing poverty, then
58. From the reasons of MacDonald J. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, as reproduced by
the Court of Appeal in Bernard, supra note 17 at 197. Similarly, in the decision at trial in
DartmouthIHalifaxCountyRegionalHousingAuthorityv. Sparks (1992), 112N.S.R. (2d) 389,
307 A.P.R. 309 [cited to N.S.R.] at 401, the court stated: "The restrictions imposed by virtue
of the sections in theAct are not imposed as aresult of any characteristic of race or sex or source
of income, but rather by virtue of having individually applied and individually been accepted
for public housing" [emphasis added]. In Gosselin, supra note 9 at 1676, Reeves J. finds that
poverty is attributable to a variety of factors intrinsic to the individual, such as, for example,
a poorly instilled work ethic.
59. Jackman, supra note 19 at 85. In Fernandes, supra note 12 at 415, the Manitoba Court
of Appeal stated in obiter: "Fernandes is not being disadvantaged because of any personal
characteristic or because of his disability. He is unable to remain community-based because he
has no caregiver, because he must rely upon public assistance and because the facilities
available to meet his needs are limited."
60. Jackman, supra note 19 at 89.
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the interests of both those individuals and of the community at large
would be served by allowing Charter scrutiny of those processes to
ensure they meet the principles of fundamental justice.
The particular situation of the plaintiff in this case places the matter in
a context which also raises serious questions about ajustice system which
is repeatedly accused of a failure to address the poverty faced by women
and children in our society, 61 and in a context where poverty is regrettably
on the rise. There is a danger, reflected for example in the contrast
between the decision in Conrad and that in Khaliq-Kareemi, that re-
course, not only under the Charter, but to the courts at all, is something
limited to the privileged, not only by reason of their ability to access the
courts, but also by reason of the lack of interest of the legal system in the
rights and interests of those who live on the margins of poverty. This
concern is highlighted by the criticism of the plaintiff expressed by
Gruchy J.:
I conclude that had Mrs. Conrad's case been permitted to be handled in a
nonadversarial fashion in accordance with established social work proce-
dures, a much more satisfactory result might have been achieved. That did
not occur, however, because Mrs. Conrad adopted a legalistic attitude
toward the matter which forced the County to respond accordingly.... It
is my view that the welfare system was turned into some sort of an
adversarial process by the parties and that approach had the effect of
putting the County on the defensive rather than to allow it to co-operate in
the best interests of all concerned.62
While judicial deference to administrative decision-makers is generally
considered appropriate, the courts do maintain a fundamentally impor-
tant jurisdiction over procedural fairness and, through s. 7, the principles
of fundamental justice. Charter rights are meant to be interpreted and
enforced through our judicial system, which is by its nature adversarial.
The limiting of the scope of s. 7 to exclude in broad terms the application
of the Charter to the administration of the social welfare system, suggests
an extreme judicial reluctance to scrutinize the processes by which social
welfare benefits are allocated and withdrawn. In drawing the line be-
tween administrative efficiency and fundamental rights, Gruchy J. has
restricted the Charter rights of welfare recipients in their most significant
interaction with the state.
61. In fact, in its decision in Sparks the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal took note of the
relationship of gender to poverty: "Single mothers are now know to be the group in society most
likely to experience poverty in the extreme" (supra note 23 at 98). The situation of women in
poverty has also been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Moge v. Moge, [1992]
3 S.C.R. 813 at 853, where L'Heureux-Dub6 J. for the unanimous Court describes the
feminization of poverty as "an entrenched social phenomenon."
62. Supra note I at 266.
